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An "invention" is defined as the activity directed toward the discovery of new useful knowledge about products and processes, as described by Smookler (1957) and it is most frequently protected by the use of patents which grant exclusive rights to the owner of the invention for a limited time in exchange for full disclosure. Users of this type of Intellectual Property (IP) can be corporations, small businesses, nonprofit organizations and even more individual or independent inventors. 1 Governments, mainly, and nonprofit organizations have developed programs to promote innovation by individuals, as their inventive performance is a perennial issue of policy interest. They provide consulting and evaluation services to inventors who want to transfer their inventions to the marketplace. Asterbo and Gerchak (2001) , in a case study of the Canadian Innovation Centre and its Inventor's Assistance Program, found significant social benefits in consulting independent inventors on how they can best manage and/or commercialize their inventions. However, such programs are not always successful. Spear (2006) , for example, indicates that the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC) in the UK had low success rates in independent inventors' patent commercialization. 2 The objective of this paper is to examine commercialization and market potential of individual inventors' patented inventions. In particular, we are interested in how the patent's characteristics, the size of the research team, the prior patenting experience of the inventor, the inventor's previous corporate ties, as well as some state macroeconomic factors are associated with commercialization of inventor owned 1 According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), an independent inventor is defined as one whose patent at the time of grant is unassigned (i.e., patent rights are held by the inventor) or assigned to an individual: (http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby_in.html). 2 NRDC started in 1948 to help inventors in UK transform inventions into innovations. For an inDdepth analysis of the program see Crawley (1993) and Lavington (2011). US patents. Although, it is difficult to observe commercialization, we infer to this concept in this study by exploiting a particular facet of the US patent system, namely switches from Small Entity Status (SES) to Large Entity Status (LES) for renewal fee purposes.
We find that approximately twelve percent of individual inventors' patents have switched to LES. In addition, the patent characteristics, such as citations, claims and application length, are positively associated with the likelihood of a patent to be commercialized to a large corporation. Furthermore, we discover that the size of the inventive team is a positive indicator of commercial potential, a result that coincides with Singh and Fleming (2010) who show that patent quality is on average higher from research teams' than single inventors' efforts. Prior patenting experience is also positively related with commercialization. Moreover, patents, where at least one inventor has prior corporate ties, have higher probability of being commercialized, a result that agrees with findings of Lawson and Sterzi (2013) , where they have indicated that such patents are of higher quality, approximated by more forward citations. All of the above mentioned results are similar across the location of the inventor and technology fields.
This study contributes to the literature of commercialization of individual inventors' technological advancements by employing patentDlevel data contrary to the vast majority of scholarly work that has relied on primarily survey based evidence.
For instance, for surveys in the US, see Weick and Eakin (2005) and Wilkins et al (2008) , in Canada, see Amesse et al (1991) and Dagenais et al (1991) , in Sweden, see Ejermo and Gabrielsson (2007) and Braunerhjelm and Svensson, (2010) and in Italy, see Schettino et al (2013) among others. To our knowledge, this is the first study that uses such an extended dataset of individual inventors' patents, combining information from several sources and examining patent's characteristics' in the propensity of transferring patented inventions to the marketplace.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the concept of commercialization by individual inventors and how it is approximated. Section three presents the econometric specification and describes how the data is constructed.
Section four outlines the data and empirical results, whereas the final section concludes.
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There are two different ways for an individual inventor to achieve commercialization. He can either develop the invention to an end user product/service inDhouse or to license (and/or sell) the invention to a third part, usually to an established firm; see Braunerhjelm and Svensson (2010) . The former is considered as an internal (direct) while the latter as an external (nonDdirect) method of commercialization; see O' Connor and HewittDDundas (2013) .
We infer commercialization activity to large corporations from publicly available data, based on the following procedure. In the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) a patent applicant pays renewal fees in order to maintain the enforceability of a US patent. Individuals, small business and nonprofit organizations are defined as "small entities" in the code of federal register regulation.
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Patents issued to one of those entities have the right to pay SES fees, which are approximately half the fees of LES. Transfer of right (such as sale and licensing) to a large corporation of a certain patent drives to loss of SES and leads to mandatory payment of LES fees for that particular patent. This switch from SES to LES implies commercialization to a large corporation.
It should be noted that this method of identifying commercialization does not imply that all other patents were not profitable for their owners since there may be a group within the set of patents, which never switched to LES, but still were profitable.
However, our methodology captures the three main outcomes of individual inventors commercialization goals, which are either license/sell their patented inventions to a large corporation in exchange of large compensations or grow their innovative startups to an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or acquisition by a large corporation (Meyer, 2005) . In other words, we capture the individual inventors' patents that made it 'big'.
The truth is that renewal data has been extensively used to infer the private economic value of patents, since the pioneer work of Pakes (1986) and Schankerman and Pakes (1986) , whereas Bessen (2008) and Liu et al (2008) were the first to examine renewal data of US patents. Furthermore, Bessen (2008) PriorTies i is a set of two variables which capture whether the inventor has had any patents under a corporation or a university: PastCorp i takes the value of 1, if at least one inventor of the patent was an inventor in a previous patent that was owned by a corporation and 0 otherwise, whereas PastUniv i takes the value of 1, if at least one inventor of the patent was an inventor in a previous patent that was owned by a university and 0 otherwise.
StateCharacteristics i is a set of two dummies that control for state characteristics: StateHigh i takes the value of 1, if the lead inventor of patent i is located in a state that has produced the year that patent i was granted more than a thousand patents and 0 otherwise and ShareTechState i is the share of the technology field that the patent i belongs to, at the grant year in the specific state and takes values between 0 and 100. These two dummy variables are similarly constructed at the country level for foreign inventors. GrantYear i is a set of dummies that captures the year that patent i was granted. Table 1 includes the definitions of all variables used in the present paper.
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Our first source of data is the Patent Data Project, sponsored by the National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER), hereafter NBER dataset, in which all patents are categorized by assignee type. 4 The sample of interest includes all patents that are assigned to a "US individual" or "Foreign individual" or are unassigned, which means that they are owned by the patent inventors, and are issued between 1990 and 2000.
Overall, we obtain 197,407 inventorDowned patents.
From the NBER dataset we obtained directly information concerning the dummy variables TechnologyDummy and GrantYear. In addition, from the same data set we constructed the variables ShareTechState, since the location information for each patent assignee was available as well as the variable StateHigh, since we were able to calculate the number of patents for each state or country per year. The variables ForwCites, BackCitesPat, BackCitesSci, Claims, and AppLength are obtained from Lai et al (2011) . More importantly, in this dataset, the authors have disambiguated inventor names and have assigned a unique identifier to each inventor.
Using this information we are able to acquire information for PastPatExperience variables. To construct PriorTies we combine information from both NBER and the dataset by Lai et al (2011) . From the latter, we obtain the inventor's patenting activity and from the former we identify which prior patents were owned by corporations or universities.
Next, we obtain information about recorded maintenance fee events for the above patents from Google Bulk downloads, a dataset maintained weekly by USPTO. 5 The event codes in this dataset enable us to distinguish for these patents whether SES or LES fees have been paid. If LES fees have been paid for a patent, we consider this observation as an indication for successful technology transfer to a large corporation. Specifically, according to the Code of Federal Regulations (37 CFR §1.27 paragraph a(1)) an individual is entitled in paying SES fees as long as he/she has ".... not assigned, granted, conveyed, or licensed, and is under no obligation under contract or law to assign, grant, convey, or license, any rights in the invention". 6 Note that this regulation applies to each individual patent. Hence, an inventor with more than one patent may pay LES fees for some and SES fees for others depending on their commercial status.
Failure to comply with the above regulations, i.e., not pay LES fees when required, will deem the patent invalid and therefore the rate of compliance is likely to be very high. On the contrary, while there could be inventors that pay LES fees, even though they do not have to do so, this is not very likely, since SES fees are approximately half of the LES fees and therefore inventors have significant incentive to take advantage of this regulation. Even though there are still cases where there may be noise in the data any faulty renewal payments are most likely random and therefore will not bias our results.
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Before we get into the empirical analysis, it is worthwhile to present some interesting aspects of the dataset. First, as can be seen from Figure 1 , the share of inventor owned patents issued per year in the US during the period 1990D2000
remains roughly constant at the range of 15% of the total number of patents. In 6 We should note that the regulation further states that an inventor "… who has transferred some rights in the invention to one or more parties… can also qualify for small entity status if all the parties who have had rights in the invention transferred to them also qualify for small entity status either as a person, small business concern, or nonprofit organization". In other words if an inventor transfers any rights or licenses the patent another Small Entity, then the owner can still pay SES fees.
addition, the share of inventor owned patents issued per year in the US during the same period that switched to LES for renewal purposes ranges from 11% to 13%, as can be seen from Figure 2 . Overall, out of 197,407 individual inventors' patents, 23,871 (12%) switched their status to LES, as Table 2 depicts.
In particular, Table 2 versus 10.6% respectively. Given this difference, which seems to be significant, we will analyze these two groups separately. Although, it is not intuitive why this difference is observed, perhaps one possible explanation is the fact that some foreign inventors are not aware of the SES and LES renewal schemes. 8 However, this large difference cannot be wholly attributed to faulty payments and probably indicates that 7 We have already excluded from the analysis 1,316 patents for which at least one inventor is within the US and at least one is located outside the US. Results for this group are qualitatively similar to the results displayed in the paper and therefore excluded from the analysis for brevity. 8 For instance, the European Patent Office has only a single payment scheme.
foreign inventors' patents are more likely to be commercialized via a large corporation than domestic inventors' patents. Harhoff et al, 2003 and Bessen, 2008) . Note that for all the above patent metrics, differences between commercialized and nonDcommercialized patents are bigger in the case of domestic than foreign inventors' patents. This observation could support the previous reasoning that a group of foreign inventors may not be aware of the renewal schemes and therefore pay LES fees even though they do not have to. with more than a thousand patents annually, while 70% of those that do not, whereas the difference is considerably bigger when examining countries for the foreign inventors' patents; 74% versus 61% respectively. Further, for patents that switch to LES the lead inventor is located in a state that on average has 19% of the patents in the same broad technology field as the focal patent; the percentage for patents that do not switch to LES is slightly higher at 21%. Overall, we observe that state characteristics do not seem to be associated significantly with patents that have switched to LES. However, the size of the inventive activity of the country seems to make a difference when examining foreign inventors' patents.
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Having examined descriptively all the aforementioned characteristics, the next step is to study their relationships simultaneously. Harhoff et al (2003) and Bessen (2008) .
We also observe from the coefficients of InventorMed and InvetorHigh that the bigger the group of inventors in a patent the higher the likelihood of a patent switching to LES. That means that, keeping all other variables at their means, a patent with two inventors is 3.3 percentage units more likely to switch to LES than a patent with just one inventor, whereas a patent with more than two inventors is 13.8
percentage units more likely to switch to LES than a patent with just one inventor.
This finding is consistent with both Singh and Fleming (2010) and Schettino et al (2013) that found that inventors who work in teams produce patents that are of higher quality.
With respect to past patenting experience, patents with inventors with prior experience are more likely to switch to LES, as can be seen from the estimates of the coefficients of PastPats variables. Specifically, patents, where at least one inventor has one prior patent, are 3.2 percentage units more likely to switch to LES than patents where no inventor has a prior patent. Similarly, patents that at least one inventor has two or more than two prior patents are 5.4 and 10.4 percentage units respectively to switch to LES than patents where no inventor has a prior patent. This finding is also consistent with the studies of Amesse et al (1991) Overall, the aforementioned state characteristics where the lead inventor is located do not seem to be substantial.
Column 2 of Table 4 excludes patents where their inventors have little to none prior patenting experience. In particular, we only consider patents for which at least one inventor has strictly more than one patent and the results remain similar to Column 1 indicating that the above findings are not driven just by the cases where inventors have little to no prior patenting experience. Column 3 checks for the robustness of the results for outliers by dropping patents where at least one inventor has more than twenty prior past patents. As previously, results remain qualitatively similar.
Column 4 examines the above relationships in the context of foreign inventors.
The patent characteristics, as before, are positively associated with the propensity of switching to LES. The results with respect to the size of the research team, past patenting experience and prior ties, are by and large similar with the results of the domestic inventors' patents. A different result arises when exploring the patenting activity of the country that the lead inventors is located. Specifically, a patent for which the lead inventor is located in a country that produces more than a thousand patents annually it is five percentage units more likely to switch to LES than a patent for which the lead inventor is not located in such an innovative country. This result is in contrast with the domestic inventors' patents where the state's innovative activity did not have a sizeable relationship with commercialization potential and it implies that while the location of domestic inventors may play little role in commercialization after controlling for other factors, for foreign inventors it is important to be located within a country that is highly innovative. Although, it is difficult, with the data at hand, to identify large corporations that acquire or license the patents, the above finding denotes that for foreign inventors' patents, most likely candidates are firms within the same country as the lead inventor.
To obtain robustness for the previous results we perform similar estimations as in the case of foreign inventors' patents. Column 5 of Table 4 considers only patents where at least one inventor has more than one patent while Column 6 excludes patents for which at least one inventor has more than twenty patents. The results remain similar as before.
Finally, we examine how the aforementioned results vary by technology fields without distinguishing domestic versus foreign inventors, since we did not find any earmarked differences, and the results of this estimation process are reported in Table   5 . This paper considers all individual inventors' US patents between 1990D2000
and examines the factors that are associated with commercialization by large corporations. In particular, it exploits a peculiarity of the US patent system regarding the two different schemes of maintenance fee payments. Patentees are obliged to pay renewal fees at 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years after issuance for each patent to stay in force.
Individual inventors have the right to pay Small Entity Status fees for a patent they own as long they have not transferred, licensed or conveyed any rights of that particular patent to a corporation that is concerned as a Large Entity. If they do, then they are obligated to pay LES fees for that particular patent. For this reason, we employ this observation to infer commercialization activity to large corporations. 
